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Abstract 
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are among the most addressed topics in economic literature in recent years, as 
one of the most discussed issues in different countries. The research's primary purpose is to present Albanian 
residents' and taxpayers' perceptions regarding tax evasion, tax avoidance, and tax compliance. The leading 
indicators used in this report, the attitude towards tax evasion and tax avoidance, rely on individual taxpayers' 
perceptions and not on factual evidence such as the amount of income hidden from the tax authorities. Several 
studies have been done in different countries regarding the population's perception regarding factors affecting 
evasion. In this paper, we investigated the following logical sequence: in the beginning, we provided an 
overview of the fiscal system and legislation, informal economy, and fiscal evasion in Albania. This analysis 
data was taken from reports from national and international organizations. After this, we analyzed data 
obtained from a survey issued to 387 taxpayer individuals in Albania. Our objective was to identify, using 
empirical analysis, factors that influence an individual's ethical perception of tax avoidance and evasion. The 
statistical analyses we carried out in the paper were factor analyses and ordinal logistic linear regression 
analyses using the JMP statistical software. Based on the empirical research, we concluded that government 
policies positively correlate with taxpayers' behavior regarding tax compliance. Among other determinants 
influencing tax evasion, we have evaluated that higher tax rates are an essential element. The results of the 
research can be helpful for governments and other policymakers' institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
At first, we need to understand that tax evasion is a very complex and dynamic phenomenon. This result is 
attributed to the fact that the action of the various actors is interacting in the process. On one side, the 
government acts as the legislator, which sets the tax rate and social welfare laws. The fiscal administration, 
which takes care of the application aspects, promotes, and enforces the tax compliance rules. On the other side, 
there are the citizens, who, on the one hand, modify their behavior in response to the legislation and the 
practical ways in which it is implemented, and on the other, act as voters, determining the legislation in force 
and affecting the administration's practices. In Albania, as in other countries, tax avoidance and tax evasion 
have a considerable effect on the loss of budget income that may have been intended to enhance public services 
for a more significant benefit. Feige (1990) stated that the scale and rise of unreported profits and the implicit 
tax difference influence the size of budget deficits, government debt, and tax reform policies. Besides, this 
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could have consequences for economic planning as the official statistics would be inaccurate. There are also 
consequences for regional comparisons, requirements, and obligations. Albania, during the years 1945-1990, 
the period of dictatorship, was a centralized economy where Albanian finances were focused on planning and 
centralization and collective work. One of the characteristics of the communist system was the disappearance 
of private property. Albanians were convinced that: Albania was the only country that did not pay taxes and 
fees, but the “Labor party” provided every service. Nevertheless, the truth was different, and this was just 
official propaganda. Simultaneously, as in any other country, the inhabitants paid taxes and duties. They were 
included in the predetermined and controlled prices of goods, services, and other commodities provided by the 
state sectors and the economy's cooperative sectors for rural areas. The consequences of this propaganda 
continued in the years of transition, making it difficult for many citizens to accept and pay tax obligations. 
Albania paved the way for democratic developments and a market economy in the early 1990s. These changes 
brought the beginning of the development of a new tax system. Just like in other former communist countries 
of Eastern and Central Europe, the country has a relatively new tax system, creating and implementing the 
legal basis from the beginning. In formulating and implementing fiscal reforms, the country has had support 
from international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The legislation writing was based on the 
developed western countries' experience. In these three decades, there have been frequent changes regarding 
tax policies and rules for each administration. Each country has characteristics and features of different 
economic and social structures. However, some of Albania's aspects are a deficient culture of paying taxes, a 
high level of informality in the economy, unclear law on property, and the vital role of agriculture in GDP 
structure and employment.  
There have been discrepancies between tax policy and country characteristics. There have also been significant 
shortcomings in the administration of tax collection over the years by tax authorities, ineffective control 
policies, low impunity for non-payers, all creating narrow tax bases and distorting complex and challenging 
tax systems to be understood and administered. Frequent changes in tax legislation and variations in the tax 
base have negatively affected the distortion of business investment decisions and foreign investment attraction, 
which results in lower figures than the region's countries, and the problematic implementation of business 
operations. Employees are one of the main factors impacting the informal economy. Albanian Center for 
Economic Research (ACER) & Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity1 report that 
informal work is expressed in different patterns in Albania: 39.75 % of workers have declared that they do not 
have a signed contract. In comparison, 30.29 % of employees have claimed that they do not account for social 
and health care. Most of these workers without a formal contract are employed in the private sector. Employers 
do not pay taxes on wages, retirement, and medical insurance, and workers, on the other hand, receive more 
income even though they are short-term bonuses. 
Among Albania's last three decades' most critical problem is tax collecting institutions' inability to collect all 
tax liabilities from individuals and businesses. One of the critical reasons for the tax disparity is taxpayers' and 
prospective taxpayers' inability to comply with tax laws. One of the other reasons is the informal economy 
level, which refers to international organizations' reports. The World Bank Group (2013)2, through an empirical 
study, showed that 37.3% of businesses believed that the court system is fair, impartial, and uncorrupted 
(primarily small and medium-sized businesses). Among other significant problems, they evaluated tax 
administration, tax collection, and corruption by public officials. Another metric used was the number of 
companies that began to operate without formal registration. The amount was 100 percent of all start-up firms, 
which directly approximates the prevalence of informality in the private economy. 
For the years 1996-2012, based on the method used, the lowest value was 13.6% of GDP (using simple 
currency ratio) and the highest value 38% of GDP (using the electrical energy consumption method). 
Moreover, Albanian government assessments over the years have shown that the level of informality in the 
economy is very high. According to the European Monetary Fund data, Albania's informal economy had a 
minimum level of 25.52% in 2012 and the maximum level of 43.1% in 1990. Over the years, various 
governments have undertaken policies to combat these phenomena. For the government to undertake as fruitful 
procedures as possible so that taxpayers' behavior can be changed by making them more accountable, it is also 
essential to understand and identify their perception. Some of the worth mentioning elements in Albania's high 
informality are undeclared work, reporting annual turnover, and lower incomes than in reality. One of the most 
used practices in Albania is cash payment or clearing (exchange agreement). These have made it difficult for 
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second section shows the literature review. The third section addresses the methodology and empirical analysis 
and testing of the hypothesis − the fourth section presents conclusions and discussion and some limitations in 
the research and future work projects. 
2. Literature Review 
Fiscal evasion or concealment of income for non-payment of tax liabilities, increased declaration of 
expenditures, is an old story in the world, which was born in parallel and at the same time with the state itself. 
Financial deviations are actions that intentionally misinterpret the performance of a company's financial report 
or statement, as well as its economic terms. They range from the simplest, such as changes in accounting 
provisions, to the most severe, fraudulent recognition or misstatement of false income. Legal tax evasion can 
occur because of legal ambiguities. Tax avoidance is tax mitigation, tax planning, or legal tax minimization by 
creating financial means and anything else legally permissible. Avoiding taxes further lower budget revenues 
and puts into disrepute the tax scheme. Hence, governments must either stop tax evasion or hold tax avoidance 
within limits. Regardless of the ways, all cases of tax evasion are contrary to the national interest. Undoubtedly, 
the reduction of financial resources from non-payment of tax obligations affects public investments and 
expenditures and increases public debt. As one of the tax evasion elements, it is worth mentioning that unfair 
competition is a pervasive phenomenon in Albania's transitional years. 
One of the crucial questions regarding the tax evasion phenomenon is why people cheat with taxes and fees? 
2.1 Theoretical Framework. The phenomenon of tax avoidance and tax evasion has a shared objective: to 
pay fewer taxes and 'circumvent' tax legislation. Often the two words are readily misunderstood, but there is a 
significant distinction between the criminal and administrative aspects. In general, while the ultimate objective 
in both circumstances is not to satisfy one's fiscal obligations based on one's economic availability, tax 
avoidance consists of transactions without economic substance that, while respecting the law, ensure indirect 
tax advantages favors of taxpayers. Tax avoidance is intermediate between tax evasion (open breach of the 
normative requirements of tax law, failure to disclose and/or falsification of data) and legal savings (tax 
preparation as a lawful exercise of the independence and contractual autonomy of the parties) (Tanto, 2021). 
Fiscal evasion is a very complex phenomenon. Different economic, psychological, and sociological theories 
give various reasons: 
2.1.1 Economic Theories. Traditional and economic theories base their analysis on the premise that the human 
being has a rational behavior in estimating the costs and advantages of choosing an action. The behavioral 
model of homo economicus does not clearly distinguish the two phenomena in terms of the degree of legality 
but is based on the concept of risk. Any individual is likely to become evasive if they think that marginal 
benefits will be higher than marginal costs, depending on the probability of being detected. The task arises for 
states to implement adequate controls that would prevent the actions of evaders. Models have been developed 
that consider the benefit of non-payment, the structure of penalties, and the probability of tax authorities' 
detection. 
Torgler and Schaltegger (2006), Slemrod (2007) included individual choices (choices on the labor market, 
sectoral options, elusive decisions), as well as alternative sanctions, the introduction of alternative penalties, 
taxes, and withholding taxes as essential elements that affect tax evasion. They also consider incorporating the 
ambiguity and uncertainty about irrelevant budgetary criteria, recognizing the usefulness of providing public 
services, giving rewards positive to individuals for honesty, and selection rules that allow systematic checks. 
The tax administration decides whom to monitor and control based on tax return records. Some authors think 
that it is precisely the high tax rates that affect the decline in tax compliance. Fisman and Wei (2001) 
acknowledge that a higher tax rate encourages evasion. After studying the phenomena in Albania, Gashi and 
Kukaj (2016) concluded that tax rates are crucial when planning the country's fiscal policy to promote tax 
avoidance and deter customs duties. Any other research, on the other hand, looks at the case with skepticism. 
Adebisi and Gbegi (2013) have shown a negative correlation between tax rates, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. 
It is essential for every state that citizens cooperate with state norms and institutions. It is fundamental that 
they have the will and desire to pay taxes and why this depends directly on several factors. Economists focus 
on external factors such as fiscal pressure, income levels, the efficiency of controls exercised by tax authorities, 
fees, and penalties in non-payment, but studies also focus on social and psychological factors. 
2.1.2 Psychological Theories. Psychological theories consider the economic explanation very simple. Like 
economists, psychologists explain human behavior as a function of individual variables, but much more 
complex and complicated than those used by economists. An essential variable of these is tax evasion's moral 
acceptability, while human beings are moral beings. Via observational or field research on tax behavior, 
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psychologists have measured and examined in-depth psychological variables such as social perceptions and 
government attitudes in recent years. Moreover, economic variables depend on the perception and attitude of the 
individual, who belong to psychology. Camerer et al. (2004) show that economic behavior is highly dependent 
on psychological, institutional, cultural, and even biological factors. Albania is one of the developing countries 
in the Mediterranean. There is no lack of evidence for the hypothesis that there is a “Mediterranean culture” 
of evasion. It is known that the Romans have hidden their jewels to avoid luxury taxes and that Greece, Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal are among the Mediterranean countries with the highest rate of evasion or underground 
economic rates in the Western world to date (Santoro, 2010). Bosco and Mittone (1997) follow an altruistic 
perspective and emphasize that taxpayers are concerned about their well-being and social well-being. Their 
option of escape is limited by the reality such that their escape reduces the amount of money available for 
social well-being.  
Andrighetto et al. (2016) conducted a cross-analysis study based on national stereotypes between Sweden and 
Italy, where they forecast a higher degree of integrity in Sweden than in Italy. The results indicate that where 
both countries face a tax compliance scenario consisting of a transparent tax system, an efficient allocation 
regime, and simple audit rules and penalties, the average credibility level is relatively high. The viability of an 
agreement between the taxpayer and the government relies on the government taxpayer's view. Kogler et al. 
(2013) and Turner (2005) have shown that the degree of voluntary enforcement is more affected by taxpayers' 
confidence in the government, particularly the tax system. Psychological research indicates that internal 
variables are of equal significance to economic elements: the perception of tax laws by taxpayers, their attitudes 
to government and taxes, personal expectations, social norms, and openness, as well as motivational 
enforcement tendencies, are psychological determinants that shape behavior towards taxes (Hofmann et al., 2008; 
Kirchler, 2007). Based on the findings, Kogler and Kirchler (2019) analyze the importance of taxpayers' social 
representations and behaviors towards taxes and discuss independent research on tax actions from the 
psychological literature. All these findings show a significant but moderate impact of social representations 
and attitudes on tax conduct. 
2.1.3 Sociological Theories. Sociological theories say that the cause must be sought in the structure of the 
social system. The taxpayer lives and works in society, and their behavior is formed, not only by laws and 
administrative rules but also by their social environment. They are rewarded and punished not only by the law 
but also by society for their actions. Social norms and their persistence can, however, modify personal norms 
in the event of a conflict. A person who is not very honest can become more honest by internalizing the social 
norm over time. However, it is necessary to consider that a government that tolerates tax evasion can lead a 
person to think that the social norm is represented by the possibility of escaping so that his norm over time 
could be induced to change in favor of tax dishonesty. Many norms and expectations will affect individuals' 
behavior, especially national norms and traditions, family norms, and workplace norms and practices. Onu and 
Oats (2016) show that people's tax enforcement attitudes and actions shift after interacting with other taxpayers 
about taxes. One of the critical predictors of tax fairness is known to be social norms. They are evaluated as 
independent variables and views on government and governance, law enforcement, and the tax system's justice. 
According to them, evasion is a social phenomenon. When there is a lack of taxpayer awareness and the tax 
system and its complexity, it affects tax evasion. Personal norms include factors related to personality, moral 
values, beliefs. Wenzel (2004) concluded an empirical study in Australia. He defined three types of standards, 
personal norms, social norms, and norms relating to the expanded society, based on the theory of self-
categorization. When taxpayers identify with the culture to which expectations are applied, social norms should 
elicit concomitant actions, internalize social norms, and function accordingly. 
The psychological position that audit likelihood has as an external motivator with an effect on tax enforcement 
is emphasized by Fischer et al. (1992). People think that the probability of detecting tax evasion scams will 
increase every time controls are exercised over the company, and why this is not entirely true. Salzman et al. 
(1998) state that taxpayers have different and contradictory behaviors regarding audit probability. It often 
happens that they overestimate it, and there are other cases when after auditing a company and not detecting 
fraud, the tendency is reduced. Penalties are also substantial. More considerable fines are more effective 
intimidation than more frequent audits. Through empirical research, Kleven et al. (2011) focused on 40,000 
individual income tax filers in 2011 in Denmark, half of them randomly audited and half of them not. The results 
may be explained by broadening the traditional (rational) tax avoidance model to allow a crucial distinction between 
self-reported income and reported income from third parties. Alm and Torgler (2011), Alm et al. (2016) conducted 
studies and evaluated the existence of a positive relationship between tax evasion and corruption. Sanyal et al. 
(2000) found that tax revenue falls with the rate of income tax in the presence of dishonest and unethical tax 
authorities in countries where the degree of corruption is high. Payne and Saunoris (2020) determined that 
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corruption has a more significant effect as tax avoidance is a ubiquitous and widespread element. They assessed 
the firm-level features of a heterogeneous effect on the conditional distribution of tax evasion. Regarding the 
policy ramifications, the findings showed that measures aimed at lowering tax burdens and controlling 
corruption would be more successful while tax evasion is prevalent. A positive and vital relationship between 
the level of education, tax awareness, and tax enforcement has been developed by Kasipillari et al. (2013). 
Abdu et al. 2021 have demonstrated that corruption promotes a system of tax non-compliance among sub-
Saharan African companies because defaulting firms bribe tax officials to stop paying taxes and to be punished 
for that. Results also indicated that the perceived confidence of tax authorities is vitally essential in promoting 
tax compliance among SSA firms. Understanding taxation is one of the first variables to affect tax enforcement. 
Tax systems are inherently complex, and empirical evidence suggests a low level of knowledge (McKerchar, 2001). 
A lack of comprehension of complicated tax laws confuses, leading to mistrust and negative tax enforcement 
attitudes. Based on an observational analysis in Italy, Chiarini et al. (2013) examined the high degree of tax 
rates among taxpayers' principal tax evasion determinants. Misuse of administrative tax proceeds and the 
supposed low chance of detection are among the key factors affecting tax compliance.  
Chen et al. (2019) have shown that the tax burden, the size of the tax system, the strength of regulation, 
unemployment, agricultural jobs, and economic transparency have had significant positive effects on China's 
shadow economy. In contrast, the ratio of direct taxes to indirect taxes, fiscal stability, and income levels have 
had significant adverse effects on China's shadow economy. The taxpayer's revenue sources are one of the 
most significant considerations in deciding whether to evade taxation. There is almost no room for tax 
avoidance for taxpayers whose compensation is primarily derived from employment or benefits since 
withholding tax is levied on employers by law. In 2001, just one percent of revenue from salaries and wages 
was not reported in the United States, according to Slemrod (2007). D'Attoma et al. (2017) have found that 
even when institutional changes and reforms have successfully targeted and significantly narrowed legal and 
formal gender inequalities, behavioral disparities between males and females persist. A research was 
conducted in Kosovo by Mamuti and Mc Gee in 2016. They found that tax evasion is considered a less severe 
crime than other crimes. Tax evasion is not a matter of state financial policies, rather than values and social 
morality.  
Muharremi et al. (2014) showed that the heavy tax burden is considered one of Albania's most significant tax 
evasion elements. To determine Albania's tax evasion determinants, Andoni et al. (2017) performed an 
empirical study. Personal income and benefit tax rates, market situation, fiscal legislation, and tax 
administration capabilities are the five critical determinants that positively affect Albania's tax evasion. The 
company's turnout has a negative impact. After conducting an empirical study in Elbasan, Albania, regarding 
the expectations of taxpayers, Muceku and Balliu (2017), in a study conducted in Albania, concluded that 
taxpayers have very little faith in the fairness of the current tax system. They also found a strong correlation 
between education level and the taxpayer's income and their views of tax justice. In their attitudes toward the 
tax system, these opinions are reflected. Tanto (2021) found that in Albania, the tax disparity exists due to the 
non-implementation of regulations and the lack of taxpayers' willingness to enforce them, creating a shortfall 
in the accumulation of tax revenues. They claimed that there is a general anti-avoidance standard in the 
Albanian tax legislation that needs to be modified to improve the usefulness of this rate as the legal basis for 
addressing tax avoidance. 
2.2 Study Objectives and Hypotheses. This study's primary objective was to determine Albanian taxpayers' 
perceptions of various aspects concerning taxation. The interviewees are natural persons, residents in urban 
and rural areas, and Albanian citizens of adult age. All persons involved in the study in one form or another, 
as employees, consumers, are taxpayers. Another research question relates to the impact of individual factors 
on tax evasion in Albania. In the group of demographic elements, we have considered: gender, age, university 
education level, and residence. In the framework of this research question, the following auxiliary hypotheses 
have been posed: 
H1. Unfair competition affects tax evasion. Unfair competition at high levels would encourage tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. 
H2. Government transparency and behaviors regarding the use of taxes and duties affect the tendency for tax 
evasion, and the more informed individuals are about the use of their taxes and the more they approve of how 
the government handles taxation, the more ethical they are towards tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
H3. Perception of the tax system affects behavior towards tax evasion and tax avoidance. The fairer the tax 
system, the more ethical the behavior of people will be towards tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
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H4. The level of corruption of the tax administration affects the behavior of people towards tax evasion. The 
more the tax administration deteriorates, the more unethical is the behavior of people against tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. 
3. Methodology 
This paper used a mixed-methods research design. The qualitative aspect of the research included providing 
an in-depth overview of theoretical and scientific studies in this research field. The quantitative aspect of the 
research included obtaining primary data through the distribution and analysis of survey responses. The 
quantitative analysis in the research is described next. The first phase consisted of presenting a draft survey to 
a small group of colleagues and experts in taxation and psychology for review. Results from this review 
indicated the need for rewording several of the questions and correcting various technical errors. In the next 
phase, we piloted the survey by conducting 30 field interviews. Results from pilot testing led to 
recommendations for further clarification of various questions. Following the recommendations, the final 
survey was created and distributed online and through social media platforms and email for data gathering. 
The final phase consisted of quality control of the completed surveys. The respondent data were then analyzed 
using the JMP statistical software. 
Participants. The survey respondents consisted of Albanian citizens meeting specific requirements and having 
various characteristics. Data were obtained from 387 individual taxpayers in total. (see Appendix B and C for 
the characteristics of survey participants and the distribution of these characteristics amongst the respondents, 
respectively). We collected answers from respondents from February until July 2020.  
Material. The survey included six demographic questions and 28 questions pertaining to Albanian tax policy 
and tax avoidance and evasion ethics. Of the 28 study questions, 23 pertained to Albanian tax policy, and five 
questions pertained to the respondents' beliefs regarding the ethics of tax avoidance and evasion. These two 
categories of questions will hereafter be referred to as independent and dependent variables, respectively. 
Several survey questions are original, and others have been used in prior studies about tax evasion in other 
countries (McGee, 2014; Tarekegn, 2016). Examples of questions are “The progressive personal income tax 
system is fair” and “Individuals have information on how the taxes collected by them from the government are 
used.” The non-demographic responses were on a 7-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 
= Strongly agree. The questions used for the empirical analyses are provided in Appendix A.  
Procedure. We published the final survey using Google Forms on social media (Facebook) and distributed the 
survey to various respondents via email using disproportionate stratified random sampling to collect data. The 
individuals selected fulfilled the requirement that we received respondents from different age groups, genders, 
employment statuses, and education levels. We also requested that respondents ask others to complete the 
survey, thus utilizing a small amount of snowball sampling. 
Data Screening. There were no missing values as all survey questions were required. The generally accepted 
sample size for factor analysis of 10 times the number of variables was met. Our final sample size was 387.   
3.1 Factor Analysis. Initially, the factorability of the 23 independent variables was tested. A simple correlation 
matrix resulted in a significant correlation of .4 for most variables. Because the survey variables are ordinal, a 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient and Kendall's τb were conducted. Both tests resulted in statistically 
significant correlation values between each variable and at least one other variable at an alpha-level of .05. 
Given these results, factor analysis was determined to be suitable for all variables. Because the ability to 
identify latent constructs of our survey questions was important, factor analysis was chosen as the variable 
reduction technique. The initial eigenvalues explained 24%, 13%, 10%, and 6% of the total variance in the 
first four factors. The fifth and sixth eigenvalues measured just over 1.0, and all others resulted in eigenvalues 
under 1.0. Factor counts of three, four, five, and six were reviewed using the oblimin rotation method. The 
five-factor solution was selected for multiple reasons: 1) it explains approximately 57% of the variance, 2) a 
leveling off of the scree plot after five factors, 3) an insufficient number of loadings for the four and six-factor 
solutions, and 4) difficulty interpreting the identities of the latent constructs in the three-factor solution. Six 
items were eliminated due to cross-loading of .3 or above. These items were: Item 1, Item 4, Item 19, Item 21, 
Item 23, and Item 24. The results from this factor analysis can be seen in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Factor Loadings based on a Factor Analysis with Oblimin Rotation for 23 Independent Items from 













Item 7: The government properly uses the 
taxes and fees collected 
0.79 
    
Item 6: I am confident that the 
government is doing a good job in 
collecting taxes 
0.73 
    
Item 8: Individuals have information on 
how the taxes collected from them by the 
government are used 
0.70 
    
Item 9: The government is interested in 
having the opinion of the taxpayer's 
before making legal changes 
0.70 
    
Item 11: I believe the government is 
fighting and punishing people who avoid 
taxes and commit tax evasion 
0.66 
    
Item 4: The tax system of our country is 
fair to everyone 
0.53 0.38 
   
Item 1: Tax legislation is simple to 









   
Item 3: The social and health insurance 
contribution rate is appropriate 
 
0.66 
   
Item 5: The progressive personal income 
tax system is fair 
 
0.58 
   
Item 28: The lack of proper tax culture 




Item 27: Misuse of revenues collected by 
the government influence tax avoidance 




Item 23: A lack of transparency 
regarding fiscal changes and reforms 




Item 21: A high level of corruption from 
the tax administration influences tax 





Item 26: Non-severe punitive measures 
for violators of the law encourages tax 




Item 25: Frequent and increasing changes 
of the tax base encourage tax avoidance 
and tax evasion 
   
0.64 
 
Item 20: Continuous changes in tax 
legislation and the level of taxes 
encourage tax avoidance and tax evasion 
   
0.63 
 
Item 22: The ability of tax administration 
to control and collect taxes and levies 
from individuals and businesses 
influence tax compliance 
   
0.42 
 
Item 19: The desire to achieve significant 






Item 24: Unfair competition between 






Item 13: There is a general culture in 
Albania regarding tax avoidance and tax 
evasion 
    
0.50 
Item 12: The consequences of catching 
for tax evasion (measures, penalties, 
fines) are not very serious 
        0.44 
Item 10: The current fiscal system favors 
high-income individuals rather than low- 
and middle-income individuals 
        0.32 
Notes: Factor loadings < .30 are suppressed. Items in italics were eliminated due to cross-loading 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
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Confirmatory factor analysis was performed with the remaining 17 variables, again using the oblimin rotation. 
The first five factors explained 62% of the variance. Only one variable (Item 10) in the confirmatory factor 
analysis exhibited a loading under .30. However, this factor had a loading of over .30 with no cross-loading in 
the initial analysis. Internal consistency was measured using Cronbach's Alpha. The alphas were moderate to 
very good except for one factor: .85 Government (5 items), .77 for Tax Rate/System (3 items), .65 for Tax 
Legislation/Collection (3 items), .73 for Tax Use/Enforcement (3 items), and .40 for Perceptions of Tax Culture 
(3 items). No substantial increases in alpha for any of the scales could have been achieved by eliminating more 
items. We realized that the questions asked in the Perceptions of Tax Culture factor might not have captured 
a true evaluation of Albanian tax culture. In the light of this element and the poor reliability of this scale, we 
eliminated this factor was from further consideration. Composite scores were created for each of the four 
remaining factors by calculating the mean of each factor's components/primary loadings. The skewness and 
kurtosis were within the range for assuming a normal distribution, and examination of the histograms suggested 
that the distributions looked nearly normal (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics for the four factors). Overall, 
these analyses indicated that four distinct factors were latent in an individual's opinion and perceptions toward 
the tax system in Albania, and these factors were internally consistent. The new scales were used as predictor 
variables in our ordinal logistic regression. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach's α for Four Factors (N = 387) 
  # of Items M SD Skewness Kurtosis Cronbach's α 
Government 5 2.87 1.53 0.71 -0.21 0.85 
Tax Rate/System 3 4.05 1.66 0.01 -0.84 0.77 
Tax Legislation/Collection 3 4.47 1.47 -0.34 -0.33 0.65 
Tax Use/Enforcement 3 4.82 1.64 -0.53 -0.44 0.73 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
3.2 Data Analysis & Discussion 
3.2.1 Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis. We used ordinal logistic regression analysis to investigate which 
of the four variables shaped a person's ethical principles surrounding tax evasion and avoidance. These ethical 
beliefs were obtained through Items 14 – 18 on the survey. The predictor variables, derived through the factor 
analysis, were tested a priori to verify there was no substantial violation of the assumption of no 
multicollinearity. We conducted five separate regression models. In each model, we set the response variable 
to one of the five "ethical beliefs" dependent variables. 
Regression 1 – Item 14: It is acceptable for companies to implement unethical tax policies if this is the only 
way to keep them competitive. 
Table 3. Regression Results: Item 14: It is Acceptable for Companies to Implement Unethical Tax Policies if 
This is the Only Way to Keep Them Competitive 
  Estimate SE Wald p-value 95% CI 
Government -0.24 0.07 11.7 0.0006 (-0.38, -0.10) 
Tax Rate/System 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.8518 (-0.12, 0.14) 
Tax Legislation/Collection -0.10 0.07 2.05 0.1519 (-0.25, 0.04) 
Tax Use/Enforcement -0.22 0.07 10.20 0.0014 (-0.36, -0.08) 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
Interpretations: The model reveals a statistically significant relationship between (Government, Tax 
Use/Enforcement) and Item 14. More specifically: 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Government factor, there is a .24 decrease in Item 14. 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Tax Use/Enforcement factor, there is a .22 decrease in Item 14. 
Regression 2 – Item 15: Tax avoidance is ethical if tax levels are too high. 
Table 4. Regression Results: Item 15: Tax Avoidance is Ethical if Tax Levels are too High 
  Estimate SE Wald p-value 95% CI 
Government -0.30 0.07 17.71 0.0001 (-0.45, -0.16) 
Tax Rate/System 0.18 0.07 7.16 0.0074 (0.04, 0.32) 
Tax Legislation/Collection 0.07 0.07 0.89 0.3456 (-0.08, 0.22) 
Tax Use/Enforcement -0.28 0.07 16.37 0.0001 (-0.43, -0.14) 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
Interpretations: The model reveals a statistically significant relationship between (Government, Tax 
Rate/System, Tax Use/Enforcement) and Item 15. More specifically: 
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➢ For every one-unit increase in the Government factor, there is a 0.3 decrease in Item 15. 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Tax/Rate/System factor, there is a .18 increase in Item 15. 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Tax Use/Enforcement factor, there is a .28 decrease in Item 15. 
Regression 3 – Item 16: Tax avoidance is ethical if everyone does it. 
Table 5. Regression Results: Item 16: Tax Avoidance is Ethical if Everyone Does It 
  Estimate SE Wald p-value 95% CI 
Government -0.03 0.07 0.17 0.6767 (-0.17, 0.11) 
Tax Rate/System -0.07 0.07 1.24 0.2648 (-0.21, 0.06) 
Tax Legislation/Collection -0.08 0.07 1.10 0.2935 (-0.23, 0.07) 
Tax Use/Enforcement 0.06 0.07 0.76 0.3829 (-0.08, 0.20) 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
Interpretations: The model reveals no statistically significant relationships between the factors and Item 16. 
Regression 4 – Item 17: Fiscal evasion is morally wrong and unethical in any form and size. 
Table 6. Regression Results: Item 17: Fiscal Evasion is Morally Wrong and Unethical in any Form and Size 
  Estimate SE Wald p-value 95% CI 
Government 0.05 0.07 0.57 0.4513 (-0.09, 0.19) 
Tax Rate/System -0.08 0.07 1.49 0.2229 (-0.21, 0.05) 
Tax Legislation/Collection -0.04 0.07 0.30 0.5827 (-0.19, 0.11) 
Tax Use/Enforcement -0.18 0.07 7.20 0.0073 (-0.32, -0.04) 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
Interpretations: The model reveals a statistically significant relationship between Tax Use/Enforcement and 
Item 17. More specifically: 
For every one-unit increase in the Tax Use/Enforcement factor, there is a .18 decrease in Item 17. 
Regression 5 – Item 18: Tax evasion is ethical even if the tax level is not very high because the government 
has no right to take as much as it takes from me. 
Table 7. Regression Results: Item 18: Tax Evasion is Ethical Even if the Tax Level is not very High because 
the Government Has no Right to Take as Much as It Takes from the Author 
  Estimate SE Wald p-value 95% CI 
Government -0.54 0.07 46.14 0.0001 (-0.70, -0.38) 
Tax Rate/System 0.23 0.07 9.95 0.0016 (0.09, 0.37) 
Tax Legislation/Collection -0.06 0.07 0.73 0.3932 (-0.22, 0.09) 
Tax Use/Enforcement -0.34 0.07 20.55 0.0001 (-0.50, -0.19) 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
Interpretations: The model reveals a statistically significant relationship between (Government, Tax 
Rate/System, Tax Use/Enforcement) and Item 18. More specifically: 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Government factor, there is a .54 decrease in Item 18. 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Tax Rate/System factor, there is a .23 increase in Item 18. 
➢ For every one-unit increase in the Tax Use/Enforcement factor, there is a .34 decrease in Item 18. 
3.2.2 Overall Interpretations. The phenomenon of tax evasion is pervasive in Albania, as data from reports of 
governmental and international organizations have shown over the years. The attitude of individuals in favor 
of committing evasion or tax avoidance is not explicitly related to different types of entities that can do it (those 
who own a business). However, the spread of perceptions in its favor is also higher among people unable to 
evade (for example, public or private sector employees). Respondents' views on tax avoidance and evasion 
have shown a tendency towards a rise in tax evasion potential. This trend is observed across various 
employment types, genders, ages, education levels, and residential areas. This pattern may have been 
influenced by the repeated use of amnesty and the common perception that the payment of taxes must be 
balanced by appropriate facilities and the correctness and transparent behavior of the government that 
administer the tax collections and usage. 
The are several patterns observed from the preceding regression results. 
➢ The more an individual tends to perceive the government's role in the tax system positively, the more they 
tend to believe tax avoidance and evasion are unethical (by an individual or a company). 
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➢ Overall, even if an individual believes that the tax system and contribution amounts are fair, they tend to 
believe that tax avoidance is ethical if the tax rates get too high. For them, tax evasion is ethical because 
the government takes too much money from them in taxes. 
➢ Overall, individuals who believe that tax use and enforcement are essential factors that affect tax avoidance 
and evasion less likely to feel that tax avoidance and tax evasion are unethical. 
➢ People do not feel it is right to avoid or evade taxes just because everyone does it. No factor influenced this 
outcome overall. 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study aimed to determine how individual Albanian taxpayers feel about the tax system and the factors 
influencing tax avoidance and evasion. Tax avoidance and evasion practices are widespread, have always been, 
and will undoubtedly be the same in the future. We have identified and analyzed four potential factors 
influencing tax avoidance and tax evasion during our research study: government policies acceptance: tax rates 
and structure, tax legislation and collection, and tax use/enforcement. Torgler (2007) founded that procedural 
fairness had a leading role regarding the taxpayers' satisfaction level with the government. Institutional positive 
actions will cause a reciprocation in taxpayers' behavior. We found in our study that Factor 1 consistently 
demonstrates a significant inverse relationship with whether an individual believes that tax avoidance and 
evasion are ethical. The more an individual believes that the government is playing a positive role in tax 
levying, collection, and enforcement, the less likely they believe that tax avoidance and evasion are ethical. 
These beliefs of positive institutional behavior positively influence the level of tax compliance for the 
taxpayers. This finding supports our second hypothesis (H2). 
We further found that even if an individual felt that the tax rates and progressive tax system were fair and 
appropriate, as indicated in Factor 2, they believed that tax avoidance might be ethical if the rates become too 
high. The results confirm other studies. The level of tax enforcement is more affected by the confidence of 
taxpayers in the government, particularly against the tax system. If taxes charged and public services offered 
by the government are deemed to be fair to the taxpayer, taxpayers will want to comply with tax legislation, 
and this has a positive impact on tax compliance (Feld and Frey, 2002; Torgler et al., 2008). Furthermore, even 
when an individual was agreeable with the tax rate and system, they still believed that the government was 
taking too much, and that tax evasion may be ethical. One possible explanation of this interesting finding may 
be that individuals can justify the tax rates by the benefits received up to a certain point. However, if rates 
become too high (or they overthink tax is taken from them), evasion or avoidance may be ethical regardless of 
the fairness of the progressive system. This finding seems to lead to an inconclusive stance on our third 
hypothesis (H3).   
Finally, we found that individuals felt that misuse of taxes and lack of enforcement affect tax avoidance and 
evasion as indicted in Factor 3. The findings of this research confirm the results of previous studies by Turner 
(2005), Saad (2009), Kogler et al. (2013), and Razak and Adafula (2013), which have shown that tax perception 
can influence tax enforcement and that taxpayers' perception of government role will affect the citizens' 
intention to comply. Empirical data shows that a taxpayer who has a positive view of the government would 
be more likely to cooperate than a taxpayer who has a wrong perception of the government. Tax officials 
should also take a range of steps to allow taxpayers to value the administration role and establish a rational tax 
structure. Based on the results of the analysis, some of the recommendations addressed to tax policymakers 
are: 
➢ Design and implementation of a tax system as transparent and straightforward as possible for individual 
taxpayers. 
➢ The taxpayer's mentality toward the government is undoubtedly one of the most critical factors influencing 
tax avoidance and evasion. From the taxpayer's standpoint, if the government manages the taxpayer's 
money correctly, most taxpayers felt optimistic about paying their taxes (Oberholzer, 2008a). The taxpayer 
would be even more committed to compliance with tax laws as the government spends the taxpayer's money 
on improving the taxpayer's life and looking after him, such as making him feel safe or maintaining 
hospitals and schools in good working order. 
➢ It is vital to improving the tax collection system and better manage the funds raised by government bodies 
as this boosts taxpayers' confidence and boosts tax compliance to levels and higher in the future. 
Since tax evasion is such a complicated and systemic phenomenon, a single approach would not suffice to 
minimize it to appropriate levels. To enhance tax collection and improve their administration, a structured 
package of tools is needed that, on the one hand, discourages taxpayers from evading taxes while, on the other 
hand, simplifies the administration's job. 
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4.1 Limitations of the Study and Future Research. We plan to extend this study in several ways in the 
future. First, we would like to create a new survey that more fully captures Albania's tax culture's beliefs.  
Because the questions around tax culture loaded too low in our factor analysis, we believe that a more focused 
survey on specific cultural characteristics surrounding tax culture would be appropriate. Next, we would like 
to investigate further the ethical beliefs regarding tax avoidance and evasion, specifically from the viewpoint 
of business owners. Because our questions regarding unfair business competition and profit-making had to be 
eliminated, we could not evaluate our first hypothesis (H1). We would also like to analyze the effects of 
demographic characteristics on individuals' ethical beliefs surrounding tax avoidance and evasion. 
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Appendix A. Survey Questions/Items 
Item 1: Tax legislation is simple to understand and apply. 
Item 2: The personal income tax rate is appropriate. 
Item 3: The social and health insurance contribution rate is appropriate. 
Item 4: The tax system of our country is fair to everyone. 
Item 5: The progressive personal income tax system is fair. 
Item 6: I am confident that the government is doing a good job in collecting taxes. 
Item 7: The government uses properly the taxes and fees collected. 
Item 8: Individuals have information on how the taxes collected from them by the government are used. 
Item 9: The government is interested in having the opinion of their citizens before making legal changes. 
Item 10: The current fiscal system favors high-income individuals rather than low- and middle-income 
employees. 
Item 11: I believe the government is fighting and punishing people who evade taxes and commit tax evasion. 
Item 12: The consequences of catching for tax evasion (measures, penalties, fines) are not very serious. 
Item 13: There is a general culture in Albania regarding tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
Item 14: It is acceptable for companies to implement unethical tax policies if this is the only way to keep them 
competitive. 
Item 15: Tax avoidance is ethical if tax levels are too high. 
Item 16: Tax avoidance is ethical if everyone does it. 
Item 17: Fiscal evasion is morally wrong and unethical in any form and size. 
Item 18: Tax evasion is ethical even if the tax level is not very high because the government has no right to 
take as much as it takes from me. 
Item 19: The desire to achieve significant profits in a short time encourages evasion. 
Item 20: Continuous changes in tax legislation and the level of taxes encourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 21: A high level of corruption from the tax administration encourages tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 22: The ability of the tax administration to control and collect taxes and levies from individuals and 
businesses influence tax compliance. 
Item 23: A lack of transparency regarding fiscal changes and reforms encourages tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 24: Unfair business competition influences tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 25: Frequent and increasing changes of the tax base encourage tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 26: Non-severe punitive measures for violators of the law encourages tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 27: Misuse of revenues collected by the government influences tax avoidance and evasion. 
Item 28: The lack of a proper tax culture influences tax avoidance and evasion. 
Appendix B. Frequency table of survey respondent demographic characteristics 
Demographic Attribute Requirements/Sample Frame Frequencies 






















Education Level Primary school, high school, college 














Employment Status Unemployed, student, private employee, 













Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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